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Abstract. From 25.02.2007 to 02.03.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07091
Mobility, Ubiquity and Security was held in the International Confer-
ence and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar,
several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work
and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given
during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are
put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar top-
ics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are
provided, if available.
Keywords. Mobility, conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, type systems,
static analysis, information ﬂow, cryptography, proof-carrying code
07091 Executive Summary  Mobility, Ubiquity and
Security
Increasing code mobility and ubiquity raises serious concerns about the security
of modern computing infrastructures. The focus of this seminar was on securing
computing systems by design and by construction.
Keywords: Mobility, conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, type systems, static
analysis, information ﬂow, cryptography, proof-carrying code
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1101
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07091
Mobility, Ubiquity and Security
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1102
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Gradual Release: Unifying Declassiﬁcation, Encryption
and Key Release Policies
Aslan Askarov (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
Information security has a challenge to address: enabling information-ﬂow con-
trols with expressive information release (or declassiﬁcation) policies. Existing
approaches tend to address some aspects of information release, exposing the
other aspects for possible attacks. It is striking that these approaches fall into
two mostly separate categories: revelation-based (e.g. information purchase, ag-
gregate computation, moves in a game) and encryption-based declassiﬁcation
(e.g. sending encrypted secrets over an untrusted network, storing passwords).
This paper introduces gradual release, a policy that uniﬁes declassiﬁcation, en-
cryption and key release policies. We model the knowledge of an attacker by the
sets of possible secret inputs as functions of publicly observable outputs. The
essence of gradual release is that knowledge must remain constant between re-
leases. Gradual release turns out to be a powerful foundation for release policies,
which we demonstrate by formally connecting revelation-based and encryption-
based declassiﬁcation. Furthermore, we show that gradual release can be prov-
ably enforced by security types and eﬀects.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, declassiﬁcation
Joint work of: Askarov, Aslan; Sabelfeld, Andrei
Information Flow, Modularity, and Declassiﬁcation
Anindya Banerjee (Kansas State University, US)
We give, via a relational Hoare-like logic, the speciﬁcation of an interprocedural
and ﬂow sensitive (but termination insensitive) information ﬂow analysis for
heap-manipulating programs. Pointer aliasing is ubiquitous in such programs,
and can potentially leak conﬁdential information. Thus the logic employs agree-
ment assertions to describe the noninterference property that formalizes conﬁ-
dentiality, and employs region assertions to describe possible aliasing. The logic
supports local reasoning about state in the style of separation logic. In the sec-
ond part of the talk, we show how the logic can be used to formalize some
recent proposals for declassiﬁcation. Parts of this work are joint with Torben
Amtoft, Sruthi Bandhakavi, Roberto Giacobazzi, Isabella Mastroeni and David
Naumann.
Keywords: Declassiﬁcation, Hoare logic, information ﬂow, separation logic,
two-state assertions
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Certiﬁcate translation for optimizing compilers
Gilles Barthe (INRIA Sophia Antipolis, FR)
Certifying compilation provides trust in a mobile code infrastructure, by gen-
erating a formal proof, agreeable by the code consumer, that certiﬁes that the
delivered code satisﬁes appropriate conditions. Since proofs are generated auto-
matically, such properties are restricted to suﬃciently basic safety policies. On
the other hand, (possibly interactive) program veriﬁcation aims at proving, a
broader set of safety, security, or functionality properties.
We present Certiﬁcate Translation, a novel technique that brings the beneﬁts
of interactive software veriﬁcation to the code consumer. It consists of an exten-
sion for program transformations that automatically translates a formal proof
of functional correctness of programs (in high-level languages) into certiﬁcates
for executable code.
In this talk, we explain the convenience of the approach, and describe the
proof transformations required when speciﬁc program optimizations are applied.
Emphasis will be made on proof transformations that rely on what we call a
Certifying Analyzer, i.e. an extension for a static analyzer that automatically
returns a proof for the result of the analysis.
Keywords: Languages and compilers, optimization, program transformation,
proof-carrying code, static analysis
Joint work of: Barthe, Gilles; Kunz, César; Grégoire Benjamin; Rezk, Tamara
Full Paper: http://www-sop.inria.fr/.../certtrans-SAS06.pdf
Integration of a Security Type System into a Program
Logic
Richard Bubel (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
Type based systems and program logics are two approaches used in program
analysis. The presented work has been performed within the MOBIUS project
and aims at integrating both approaches in a common logic framework in or-
der to combine their strengthens. These are automation and eﬃciency on the
type-based system side with the generality and completeness on the program
logic side. The presented work emulates the type-based system of Hunt and
Sands for analysing secure information ﬂow within a program logic. Therefore
an abstraction-based calculus has been developed. It is shown that any deriva-
tion of the type-based system can be transformed into a proof of the program
logic. The proof is constructive, which allows to deduce that it is not signiﬁ-
cantly harder to ﬁnd a proof in the program logic as to ﬁnd a corresponding
4 G. Barthe, H. Mantel, A. Myers, P. Müller and A. Sabelfeld
derivation in the type-based system. We outline further how declassiﬁcation can
be treated within the logic framework. A unique logic framework allows also the
use of uniform certiﬁcates, which is an important property for proof carrying
code.
Keywords: Type systems, information ﬂow, declassiﬁcation
Joint work of: Bubel, Richard; Hänle, Reiner; Pan, Jing; Rümmer, Philipp;
Walter, Dennis
A Complete Logic of Knowledge and One-Way Computable
Terms
Mads Dam (KTH - Stockholm, SE)
The combination of epistemic logic and formal cryptography oﬀers a potentially
very powerful framework for security protocol veriﬁcation. We address two main
challenges towards such a combination; First, the expressive power, speciﬁcally
the epistemic modality, needs to receive concrete computational justiﬁcation.
Second, the logic must be shown to be, in some sense, formally tractable. Ad-
dressing the ﬁrst challenge, we provide a generalized Kripke semantics that uses
permutations on the underlying domain of cryptographic messages to reﬂect
agents' limited computational power. Using this approach, we obtain logical
characterizations of important concepts of knowledge in the security protocol
literature, speciﬁcally Dolev-Yao style message deduction and static equivalence.
Answering the second challenge, we exhibit an axiomatization which is sound
and complete relative to the underlying theory of cryptographic terms, and to
an omega rule for quantiﬁers. The axiomatization uses largely standard axioms
and rules from ﬁrst-order modal logic. In addition, there are some novel axioms
for the interaction between knowledge and cryptography. Time permitting, we
illustrate the logic on examples such as Schaum mix, a Crowds style protocol,
and an electronic payments protocol reminiscent of SET.
Keywords: Cryptography, epistemic logic, ﬁrst-order logic, multi-agent systems,
static equivalence
Joint work of: Cohen, Mika; Dam, Mads
A Static Approach to Secure Service Composition
Pierpaolo Degano (Università di Pisa, IT)
We will present a static approach for studying secure composition of software.
We use λreq, an extension of the λ-calculus, and we study resource usage analysis
and veriﬁcation.
Mobility, Ubiquity and Security 5
The calculus λreq features dynamic creation of resources, and encloses security-
critical code in usage policy framings with a possibly nested, local scope. Addi-
tionally, it has primitives for selecting and invoking services that respect given se-
curity requirements. The actual runtime behaviour of services is over-approximated
by a type and eﬀect system. Types are standard and eﬀects include the actions
with possible security concerns, as well as information about which services may
be invoked at runtime. These approximations are model-checked to verify policy
framings within their scopes. This allows for removing any runtime execution
monitor, and for instrumenting the code with local checks whenever these may
help. Also, our static analysis can be used to determine the plans driving the
selection of those services that match the security requirements on demand.
Keywords: History based security, type and eﬀect systems, web services
Joint work of: Degano, Pierpaolo; Bartoletti, Massimo; Ferrari, Gian-Luigi;
Zunino, Roberto
See also: http://www.di.unipi.it/bartolet/pubs/pubs.html
JavaScript: Mobility & Ubiquity (Two out of Three Ain't
Bad)
Brendan Eich (MOZILLA - Mountain View, US)
JavaScript is almost twelve years old and used on at least 500 million web
pages and in other wide-scale settings. After a brief summary of its key fea-
tures, we review its security models starting from 1995 with emphasis on data
tainting. Since the renewal of browser competition and Web 2.0, workloads
have stressed browsers' long-standing security models, which are either sound
and over-restrictive, or unsound and exploited by attackers. We list six top se-
curity problems and focus on three relevant to advanced JavaScript use-cases:
high principals viewing low objects, mashups in hosted content, and browser
extensions that rewrite web pages on the ﬂy. It appears that all of these cases
can be secured by hybrid data tainting, with static analysis to taint variables
set in implicit ﬂows, and dynamic taint propagation along explicit ﬂows.
Keywords: Data tainting, information ﬂow, JavaScript, same origin
Program Veriﬁcation, Non-Interference, and
Declassiﬁcation Applied to Privacy in Data Mining
Amy Felty (University of Ottawa, CA)
In today's society, people have very little control over what kinds of personal
data are collected and stored by various agencies in both the private and public
sectors.
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Moreover, the ability to infer new knowledge from existing data is increasing
rapidly with advances in database and data mining technologies. We describe
an approach to addressing this problem that allows individuals to specify con-
straints on the way their own data is used. We use program correctness methods
to allow developers of software that processes personal data to provide assur-
ances that the software meets the speciﬁed privacy constraints. Our notion of
privacy correctness diﬀers from general software correctness in two ways. First,
properties of interest are simpler and thus their proofs are generally easier to au-
tomate. Second, this kind of correctness is stricter; in addition to showing that a
certain relation between input and output is realized, we express constraints on
information ﬂow to show that only operations that respect privacy constraints
are applied during execution. We consider two approaches. In the ﬁrst approach,
we express programs directly in Coq and state and prove privacy properties as
theorems about such programs. The second approach works directly on Java pro-
grams. Speciﬁcations are written in the Java Modelling Language (JML), and
Hoare-style program veriﬁcation is carried out using the Krakatoa tool, which
generates proof obligations in Coq and helps to automate their proofs.
Keywords: Data mining, declassiﬁcation, information ﬂow, non-interference,
privacy, program veriﬁcation
Joint work of: Felty, Amy; Matwin, Stan; Capretta, Venanzio; Dufay, Guillaume
A Framework for Parameterizing Type Systems with
Relational Information
Daniel Hedin (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
The precision of information ﬂow analyses improves if certain properties about
the analyzed program are known. Examples of such properties are aliasing infor-
mation, value equality and nil pointer freeness. Recently proposed information
ﬂow analyses use an integrated alias analysis to improve their precision. In these
cases the alias analysis is built in and cannot easily be replaced, something which
makes the analyses hard to extend. We present a framework for type based infor-
mation ﬂow analyses parametrized over external analyses. We deﬁne a common
interface between the information ﬂow analysis and the external analysis re-
quired to reason about the store and the heap. We prove the correctness of
the framework and show how it can embed a number of previously presented
analyses.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, type systems, static analysis
Joint work of: Hedin, Daniel; Gedel, Tobias
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Bytecode Modeling Language
Marieke Huisman (INRIA Sophia Antipolis, FR)
We present the Bytecode Modeling Language (BML), the Java bytecode cousin
of JML. BML allows the application developer to specify the behaviour of an
application in the form of annotations, directly at the level of the bytecode. An
extension of the class ﬁle format is deﬁned to store the speciﬁcation directly
with the bytecode. This is a ﬁrst step towards the development of a platform for
Proof Carrying Code, where applications come together with their speciﬁcation
and a proof of correctness. BML is designed to be closely related with JML.
In particular, JML speciﬁcations can be compiled into BML speciﬁcations. We
brieﬂy discuss the tools that are currently being developed for BML, and that
will result in a tool set where an application can be validated throughout its
development, both at source code and at bytecode level.
Keywords: Speciﬁcation, bytecode, proof carrying code, veriﬁcation
Joint work of: Burdy, Lilian; Huisman, Marieke; Pavlova, Mariela
Full Paper: ftp://ftp-sop.inria.fr/everest/Marieke.Huisman/bml.pdf
Preserving Privacy in Service Composition Using
Information Flow Control
Dieter Hutter (DFKI Saarbrücken, DE)
The vision of a landscape of heterogeneous web services deployed as encapsu-
lated business software assets in the Internet is currently becoming a reality as
part of the Semantic Web. When pro-active agents handle the context-aware
discovery, acquisition, composition, and management of application services and
data, ensuring the security of customers' data becomes a principle task.
To dynamically compose its oﬀered service, an agent has to process and
spread conﬁdential data to other web services demanding the required degree of
security. In this talk we propose a methodology based on type-based informa-
tion ﬂow to control the privacy of data and their proliferation within a set of
communicating web services.
Keywords: Semantic web, web services, information ﬂow
Dependency-graph-based protocol analysis
Peeter Laud (University of Tartu, EE)
In a dependency graph, nodes correspond to operations. Edges between nodes
connect producers of data to their consumers.
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A dependency graph makes explicit, which data is used where; this informa-
tion is not so clearly presented in other types of program representation, such as
abstract syntax trees or control ﬂow graphs. Certain forms of program depen-
dency graphs can also be given semantics, although it is in general more tricky
than for more orthodox representations.
Program (or protocol) dependency graphs make certain program transfor-
mations convenient, in particular those that correspond to deﬁnitions of crypto-
graphic primitives. These transformations do not observably change the seman-
tics of a protocol, but may change it syntactically in such a way that its security
becomes more obvious. In our talk, we present a prototype protocol analyser,
the transformations that we have implemented, and the insights gained.
Keywords: Dependecy graph, protocol analysis, program transformation
Joint work of: Laud, Peeter; Tahhirov, Ilja
Modeling and Enforcing Security & Trust Management
Policies (on JVM)
Fabio Martinelli (CNR - Pisa, IT)
We present part of our ongoing research for deﬁning an integrated framework for
the speciﬁcation, analysis and enforcement of security and trust in mobile and
dynamic scenarios. We aim at showing how the same machinery applied for the
formal veriﬁcation of security protocols may be useful to model and analyze trust
management procedures. From another perspective, we show also how the same
modeling language may be applied as a local policy for run-time enforcement
mechanisms for Java computational services.
Keywords: Trust policies, run time enforcement, mobile applications
Joint work of: Martinelli, Fabio; Mori, Paolo; Petrocchi, Marinella; Vaccarelli,
Anna
Ensuring Conﬁdentiality, Integrity, and Availability by
Construction
Andrew Myers (Cornell University, US)
Trustworthy computing systems must provide data conﬁdentiality and data in-
tegrity, and must be available. These security properties can be provided by
construction, by compiling high-level, security-typed source code into explicitly
distributed, security-typed target code. This code transformation provably pre-
serves the conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability properties of the source. A
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key technical contribution is the new target language, which describes distrib-
uted computation. In this language, any well-typed program satisﬁes noninter-
ference properties that ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity. Further, the language
supports the distribution and replication of code and data using quorum repli-
cation, which enables simultaneous enforcement of integrity and availability. A
novel timestamp scheme handles out-of-order accesses by concurrent distributed
threads without creating covert channels. Complex security mechanisms are au-
tomatically deployed by the compiler and run-time system in response to explicit
security policies.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, conﬁdentiality, integrity, distributed systems, se-
curity, compiler
Generic Universe Types
Peter Müller (ETH Zürich, CH)
Ownership is a powerful concept to structure the object store and to control
aliasing and modiﬁcations of objects. This talk presents an ownership type sys-
tem for a Java-like programming language with generic types. Like our earlier
Universe type system, Generic Universe Types enforce the owner-as-modiﬁer dis-
cipline. This discipline does not restrict aliasing, but requires modiﬁcations of
an object to be initiated by its owner. This allows owner objects to control state
changes of owned objects, for instance, to maintain invariants. Generic Universe
Types require a small annotation overhead and provide strong static guarantees.
They are the ﬁst type system that combines the owner-as-modiﬁer discipline
with type genericity.
Keywords: Ownership, universe types
Joint work of: Dietl, Werner; Drossopoulou, Sophia; Müller, Peter
See also: http://sct.ethz.ch/publications/index.html
Static Analysis for DRM
Flemming Nielson (Technical University of Denmark, DK)
Digital Rights Management is a security property gaining in importance due to
commercial interest. It is well known that static analysis can be used to validate
a number of more classical security policies, such as discretionary and mandatory
access control policies, as well as communication protocols using symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography.
We show how to develop a staged Flow Logic for validating the conformance
of client software with respect to a Digital Rights Management policy and with-
out imposing any cryptographic protection. Our approach is suﬃciently ﬂexible
that it extends to fully open systems that can admit new services on the ﬂy.
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Keywords: Digital Rights Management, static analysis, trusted computing base,
distributed services
Joint work of: Hansen, René Rydhof; Nielson, Flemming; Riis Nielson, Hanne;
Probst, Christian
A Certiﬁed Lightweight Non-Interference Java Bytecode
Veriﬁer
David Pichardie (IRISA - Rennes, FR)
Non-interference is a semantical condition on programs that guarantees the ab-
sence of illicit information ﬂow throughout their execution, and that can be
enforced by appropriate information ﬂow type systems. Much of previous work
on type systems for non-interference has focused on calculi or high-level pro-
gramming languages, and existing type systems for low-level languages typically
omit objects, exceptions, and method calls, and/or do not prove formally the
soundness of the type system. We deﬁne an information ﬂow type system for a
sequential JVM-like language that includes classes, objects, arrays, exceptions
and method calls, and prove that it guarantees non-interference. For increased
conﬁdence, we have formalized the proof in the proof assistant Coq; an addi-
tional beneﬁt of the formalization is that we have extracted from our proof a
certiﬁed lightweight bytecode veriﬁer for information ﬂow. Our work provides,
to our best knowledge, the ﬁrst sound and implemented information ﬂow type
system for such an expressive fragment of the JVM.
Keywords: Non-interference, information ﬂow, type systems, bytecode veriﬁer
Contextual Modal Logic
Brigitte Pientka (McGill University - Montreal, CA)
The constructive modal logic of necessity allows us to distinguish between valid-
ity and truth, and has been for example used as a logical foundation for distrib-
uted computing and information ﬂow. In this talk, I investigate the consequences
of relativizing these concepts to explicitly speciﬁed contexts. We obtain contex-
tual modal logic and its type-theoretic analogue. Contextual modal type theory
provides an elegant, uniform foundation for understanding and reasoning with
open code, and hence has the potential to for example justify type-safe linking
of code.
Keywords: Type theory, logical frameworks, intuitionistic modal logic
Full Paper: http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/bpientka/papers/tocl.pdf
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A Behavioral Semantics of Object-Oriented Components
Arnd Poetzsch-Heﬀter (TU Kaiserslautern, DE)
Behavioral semantics for software components abstract from implementation
details and describe the components' behavior in a representation-independent
way. Behavioral semantics provide an important foundation for behavioral sub-
stitutability and for behavioral interface speciﬁcations. In this paper, we de-
velop a formal behavioral semantics for class-based object-oriented languages
with aliasing, subclassing, and dynamic dispatch. The code of an object-oriented
component consists of a class and the classes used by it. A component instance
is realized by a dynamically evolving set of objects with a clear boundary to
the environment. The behavioral semantics is expressed in terms of the mes-
sages crossing the boundary. It is deﬁned as an abstraction of an operational
semantics based on an ownership-structured heap. We show how the semantics
can be used to deﬁne substitutability of components without the need of state-
based simulation relations. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the semantics can
provide a foundation for behavioral interface speciﬁcation.
Keywords: Semantics, object-oriented programming, encapsulation, represen-
tation independence
Joint work of: Poetzsch-Heﬀter, Arnd; Schäfer, Jan
See also: A representation-independent behavioral semantics for object-oriented
components. In Proceedings of the FMOODS 2007, Cyprus.
Controlling the What and Where in Language-Based
Security
Alexander Reinhard (RWTH Aachen, DE)
While a rigorous information ﬂow analysis is a key step in obtaining meaning-
ful end-to-end conﬁdentiality guarantees, one must also permit possibilities for
declassiﬁcation. Sabelfeld and Sands categorized the existing approaches to con-
trolling declassiﬁcation in their overview along four dimensions and according to
four prudent principles.
In this article, we propose three novel security conditions for controlling the
dimensions where and what, and we explain why these conditions constitute
improvements over prior approaches.
The conditions for what and where are compatible to each other and can be
applied together for a comprehensive control of declassiﬁcation.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, language-based security, declassiﬁcation, program
security
Joint work of: Mantel, Heiko; Reinhard, Alexander
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Cryptographically Sound Implementations for
Language-Based Information Flow Security
Tamara Rezk (INRIA Sophia Antipolis, FR)
Computational non-interference allows one to specify preservation of conﬁden-
tiality and integrity properties, using computational hypotheses about the cryp-
tography used in the language.
In this work we propose a sound translation from programs satisfying non-
interference, to programs with shared-memory communication and cryptogra-
phy. To this end, we propose type systems for each language, and prove that the
translation is typability preserving.
Keywords: Language-based information ﬂow security, computational model of
cryptography
Flow Sensitive Analysis of Security Properties
Hanne Riis Nielson (Technical University of Denmark, DK)
In this paper we consider service oriented architectures where many components
interact with one another using a wireless network. We are interested in questions
like: Can I be sure that I do not get unsolicited information from some service?
 unless I give my permission? Can I be sure that information I send to some
service never is leaked to another service?  unless I give my permission? We
shall develop a static program analysis for the pi-calculus and show how it can
be used to give privacy guarantees like the ones requested above. The analysis
records how information is ﬂowing through the system and keeps track of, not
only the potential conﬁgurations of the system, but also the order in which they
may be encountered.
Keywords: Pi-calculus, information ﬂow, service oriented architectures
Joint work of: Riis Nielson, Hanne; Nielson, Flemming
Closing Internal Timing Channels by Transformation
Alejandro Russo (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
A major diﬃculty for tracking information ﬂow in multithreaded programs is
due to the internal timing covert channel. Information is leaked via this chan-
nel when secrets aﬀect timing behavior of a thread, which, via the scheduler,
aﬀects the interleaving of assignments to public variables. This channel is par-
ticularly dangerous because, in contrast to external timing, the attacker does
not need to observe the actual execution time. This paper presents a composi-
tional transformation that closes the internal timing channel for multithreaded
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programs (or rejects the program if there are symptoms of other ﬂows). The
transformation is based on spawning dedicated threads, whenever computation
may aﬀect secrets, and carefully synchronizing them. The target language fea-
tures semaphores, which have not been previously considered in the context of
termination-insensitive security.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, concurrency, covert channel




Peter Ryan (University of Newcastle, UK)
For centuries, we have taken democratic process for granted and placed trust in
the paper ballot approach to casting and counting votes. In reality, the demo-
cratic process is one of considerable fragility. This was recognized at the dawn
of democracy: the Ancient Greeks devised mechanical devices to try to sidestep
the need to place trust in oﬃcials.
For over a century, the US has been using technological approaches to record-
ing and counting votes, level machines, punch cards, optical readers, touch screen
machines, largely in response to widespread corruption with paper ballots. All
have been prey to various scams and forms of corruption or just plain malfunc-
tions and have resulted in serious questions as to the legitimacy of the US 2000
and 2004 presidential elections. In the last few years, the UK has been ﬂirting
with alternative voting technologies.
In this talk I will discuss the requirements for voting systems, such as univer-
sal veriﬁability, ballot secrecy and coercion-resistance and the challenges these
pose. In particular, I will describe a cryptographic scheme, Prï¿½ ï¿½Voter, which
has the seemingly paradoxical property of providing voters with the ability to
verify that their vote is accurately counted whilst still ensuring the secrecy of
their ballot. Furthermore, this is achieved with minimal trust in the technology
or oﬃcials.
Keywords: Voting systems, ballot privacy, accuracy, universal veriﬁability, voter
veriﬁability
Full Paper: http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/research/pubs/trs/papers/988.pdf
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Information Flow Control for Java Based on Path
Conditions in Dependence Graphs
Gregor Snelting (Universität Passau, DE)
Language-based information ﬂow control (IFC) is a powerful tool to discover
security leaks in software. Most current IFC approaches are however based on
non-standard type systems. Type-based IFC is elegant, but not precise and can
lead to false alarms.
We present a more precise approach to IFC which exploits active research
in static program analysis. Our IFC approach is based on path conditions in
program dependence graphs (PDGs). PDGs are a sophisticated and powerful
analysis device, and today can handle realistic programs in full C or Java. We
ﬁrst recapitulate a theorem connecting the classical notion of noninterference to
PDGs.
We then introduce path conditions in Java PDGs. Path conditions are nec-
essary conditions for information ﬂow; today path conditions can be generated
and solved for realistic programs. We show how path conditions can produce
witnesses for security leaks.
The approach has been implemented for full Java and augmented with classi-
cal security level lattices. Examples and case studies demonstrate the feasibility
and power of the method.
Keywords: Information ﬂow control, language-based security, noninterference,
program slicing, dependency graph, path conditions, Java
Joint work of: Snelting, Gregor; Hammer, Christian; Krinke, Jens
Full Paper: http://www.infosun.ﬁm.uni-passau.de/.../issse06.pdf
Optimality and Condensing of Information Flow through
Linear Reﬁnement
Fausto Spoto (Università di Verona, IT)
Detecting information ﬂows inside a program is useful to check non-interference
or independence of program variables, an important aspect of software security.
In this paper we present a new abstract domain C expressing constancy of pro-
gram variables. We then apply Giacobazzi and Scozzari's linear reﬁnement to
build a domain C→C which contains all input/output dependences between the
constancy of program variables. We show that C→C is optimal, in the sense that
it cannot be further linearly reﬁned, and condensing, in the sense that a compo-
sitional, input-independent static analysis over C→ C has the same precision of
a non-compositional, input-driven analysis. Moreover, we show that C→C has
a natural representation in terms of Boolean formulas, which is important since
it allows one to use the eﬃcient binary decision diagrams in its implementation.
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We then prove that C→C coincides with Genaim, Giacobazzi and Mastroeni's IF
domain for information ﬂows and with Amtoft and Banerjee's Independ domain
for independence. This lets us extend to IF and Independ the properties that we
proved for C→C: optimality, condensing and representation in terms of Boolean
formulas. As a secondary result, it lets us conclude that IF and Independ are
actually the same abstract domain, although completely diﬀerent static analyses
have been based on them.
Keywords: Information ﬂow, abstract interpretation, static analysis, composi-
tionality
Resource Type Checking for Database Queries
Ian Stark (University of Edinburgh, UK)
Use of large databases in scientiﬁc research has increased to the point where
scientists can test hypotheses, perform research, and make original discoveries
entirely within the database. Several projects in medicine, biology, biochemistry,
physics and astronomy provide very large repositories (multi-terabyte) of raw
data for other scientists to then carry out experiments inside the database.
The Sloan Digital Sky SurveySkyServer is one example of this, with 14TB of
image data and spectroscopic analyses freely available for access by any internet
user. Many of these projects, as a matter of principle, oﬀer extremely liberal
access policies:
SkyServer, for example, accepts and executes arbitrary SQL queries from
any remote user without authentication. The only constraints are some fairly
generous runtime timeouts, where queries are abandoned after 10min1hr if they
have not completed.
We outline one possible contribution of programming language technology to
managing resource and availability issues in this model: speciﬁcally, a type and
eﬀect system for a nested relational query language that provides asymptotic
complexity bounds for query execution time and result size. The goal is that
such bounds can form the basis of useful feedback to users about potentially
expensive queries, as well as a portable and transparent policy language for
resource management in globally-accessible scientiﬁc databases.
Keywords: SQL types eﬀects resources availability e-Science SkyServer mobility
Joint work of: Stark, Ian; Cheney, James; MacKenzie, Kenneth
A Probabilistic Justiﬁcation of the Combining Calculus
Henning Sudbrock (RWTH Aachen, DE)
When giving a program access to secret information, one must ensure that the
program does not leak the secrets to untrusted sinks.
16 G. Barthe, H. Mantel, A. Myers, P. Müller and A. Sabelfeld
For reducing the complexity of the analysis, one can employ compositional
proof techniques. The Combining Calculus allows a compositional analysis while
keeping the choice of the proof technique variable at the beginning of a veri-
ﬁcation. During the veriﬁcation, adequate proof techniques can be chosen and
combined via plugin rules. In this talk we present the combining calculus and
how it can be applied to a probabilistic security property.
Joint work of: Kraußer, Tina; Mantel, Heiko; Sudbrock, Henning
Towards Language-Based Cryptographic Proofs
Santiago Zanella Béguelin (INRIA Sophia Antipolis, FR)
Cryptographers recognize that their ﬁeld has reached a crisis of rigor where it
is no longer viable to construct cryptographic proofs by hand, nor even verify
them. Of all cryptographic proofs techniques, a technique known as the game-
playing technique is particularly amenable to automated veriﬁcation since it
can be recast in terms of transformation of probabilistic programs. We present
a language-based framework that assists the construction and automated ver-
iﬁcation of cryptographic proofs as sequences of games. Unsurprisingly, most
of the game-rewriting transformations used by cryptographers in their proofs
happen to be common compiler optimizations that can be entirely automated
(e.g. dead-code elimination, constant propagation, code-motion). In addition, the
framework supports the application and veriﬁcation of domain speciﬁc and non-
semantic preserving transformations, and therefore provides a way to machine-
check proofs as a whole.
Keywords: Automated veriﬁcation, cryptographic proofs, language-based se-
curity, compiler optimizations
Joint work of: Zanella Béguelin, Santiago; Barthe, Gilles; Grégoire, Benjamin;
Janvier, Romain
Combining Access Control and Information Flow in DCC
Steve Zdancewic (University of Pennsylvania, US)
The Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) was introduced in 1999 by Abadi, Baner-
jee, Heintze, and Riecke to provide a framework for studying a variety of depen-
dency analyses such as information ﬂow, slicing, and binding time. The key
construct in DCC is an indexed family of monads, where the indices are security
levels and a type like Tl int can be interpreted as "an integer value with secu-
rity level l". In 2006, Abadi discovered a remarkable connection between DCC
and authorization logics, which are used to express access-control policies. The
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insight is that the type Tl φ can be read as l says φ. Here, l is treated as a
principal rather than a security level.
This talk will explain these two interpretations of DCC and describe some
preliminary work on trying to combine them in a language that can express both
information ﬂow and access control policies.
Keywords: Access control, information ﬂow, Dependency Core Calculus
